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IMITED partnerships offer investors an opportunity to profit
from the proficiency, competence, and ability of experienced gen-
eral partners. In exchange, general partners obtain the financial
backing necessary to realize their full potential for business development
and expansion. While general partners assume personal liability for the
enterprise's debts and actions, they retain almost unfettered control over
business decisions without review or effective opposition from limited
partners. Conversely, limited partners are liable only to the extent of
their investment, but they must turn over control of that investment to
the judgment and will of general partners.
Thus, while limited partnerships are grounded in a series of give-and-
take exchanges, investing in a limited partnership also requires an un-
reciprocated leap of faith. Investors must trust that general partners will
return to them the benefit for which they bargain. This Comment exam-
ines the extent to which limited partners can prevent unanticipated acts
of self-dealing that deny the return of profit and assets. The answer to
this inquiry has consequences for limited and general partners alike be-
cause general partners must earn the investors' trust before they can ob-
tain money from limited partners. A trend away from limited-
partnership investment will have dire consequences for entrepreneurs
who depend on limited partners to fund business ventures.
This Comment seeks stable ground on which investors can rest before
taking a leap of faith in trusting that general partners will protect the
financial interests of limited partners. To shed light on what is at risk, this
search begins with an analysis of the economic importance of limited
partnerships. It continues through the evolution of modern limited-part-
nership statutes and the on-going debate between concepts of fiduciary
duty and freedom of contract. The search concludes with an overview of
relevant case law and an attempt to apply that law with the certainty and
consistency investors should demand before entering a limited-partner-
ship agreement.
Through the examination of theory, statute, and case law, it is clear that
investors should approach with suspicion any limited-partnership agree-
ment that permits self-dealing. As well, it will be evident that investors
should be wary of contractual provisions waiving traditional fiduciary du-
ties owed by general partners. Examining the varying degrees of fiduci-
ary protections offered by different jurisdictions, this Comment advises
investors to enter into limited-partnership agreements only after a close
and thorough examination of the state law governing the agreement. Fi-
nally, this Comment shows that investors should avoid limited-partner-
ship agreements governed by Delaware law. It exposes Delaware law as
a haven for harmful self-dealing that can leave investors without ade-
quate legal recourse. It shows that the choice of Delaware law, in itself,
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suggests that general partners seek freedom from fiduciary limitations
and the ability to put their own interests first. Indeed, the absence of
basic fiduciary safeguards in Delaware presents a level of risk that far
outweighs the benefits offered by the limited partnership.
B. ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRIVATE INVESTMENT, AND LIMITED
PARTNERS: AN OVERVIEW
Speaking to the nation in his first State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Kennedy called on Congress to demonstrate the promise and poten-
tial of capitalism. "We must show the world what a free economy can
do," he said, "to put unused capacity to work, to spur new productivity,
and to foster higher economic growth."' To achieve that goal, the Presi-
dent asked Congress to approve a tax-incentive program that would en-
courage private-sector investment. 2
President Kennedy was not the first or last American leader to pursue
this course. Historically, American economic policy has often been di-
rected toward spurring growth by encouraging private investment. 3 This
strategy continues today in the Clinton Administration. For example, the
Clinton economic program includes incentives for investing in "cutting-
edge research and development ... that will create investment-led, tech-
nology-driven, economic growth and ... provide new high-skilled, high-
wage jobs."'4 Across the broad spectrum of start-up businesses, limited
partners play an important role in launching and sustaining new business
ventures. Everyday, in every state throughout the nation, limited part-
nerships are formed to attract investment dollars.
In Missouri, plans were launched to build a 280-acre discount outlet
mall just outside of St. Louis.5 While bulldozers prepared to clear the
way for the first 1.2 million square-feet of leasable space, limited partners
funded Phase I of the project by investing $199 million in the newly cre-
ated St. Louis MegaMall, L.P.6
In Texas, investors were called on to raise funds needed to purchase a
professional football team and move it to Houston.7 Limited partners
were asked to invest a minimum of $1 million to complete a $200-million
financing package. 8
1. President John F. Kennedy, State of the Union Address (January 30, 1961), in
"LET THE WORD Go FORTH," THE SPEECHES, STATEMENTS, AND WRITINGS OF JOHN F.
KENNEDY, 1947 TO 1963, 148 (Theodore C. Sorenson ed., 1988).
2. See id.
3. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 40-
43(1986).
4. Bruce A. Lehman, Intellectual Property: America's Competitive Advantage in the
21st Century, COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus., March 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12710866, at
*18.
5. See Linda Tucci, Developers Seek $46 Million TIF to Pave Road for Eureka
MegaMall, ST. Louis Bus. J., Oct. 29, 1996, at Al.
6. See id.
7. See John Williams, Moores Ready to Snag a Team, Many Millions Pledged Toward




Last year, limited partners invested $46 million in a California venture-
capital fund targeting local health care and technology-related compa-
nies.9 It was the sixth fund created by the La Jolla-based Sorrento Ven-
tures III, L.P., which had more than $100 million under management in
1996.10
During the 1970s and 1980s, limited partnerships attracted an esti-
mated $130 billion from investors. 1 From shopping malls, to football
teams, to start-up companies in cutting-edge industries, limited partners
were needed to provide capital, help realize entrepreneurial dreams, and
capture untapped markets for economic growth and job creation.12
These numbers suggest that, for general partners and limited partners
alike, limited partnerships are an attractive form of investment. Com-
posed of a combination of one or more limited and general partners, the
limited partnership functions much like a general partnership, 13 except
that the rights of limited partners are restricted to receiving income from
profit and dissolution. 14 While offering limited partners the same limited
liability enjoyed by corporate shareholders, limited partners also escape
the double taxation and franchise fees that burden corporations. More-
over, by enabling less experienced investors to benefit from the general
partners' expertise, the limited partnership is an opportunity for money
and experience to come together and produce profit. 15
On the other hand, a limited partnership opportunity may present
more risk than meets the eye. Investors must look beyond the lure of
limited liability, flow-through taxation, and the potential for profit de-
rived from the experience of general partners. By surrendering control,
without sufficient fiduciary protections, limited partners cannot be certain
of realizing any of the benefits.
C. THE RISK OF HARM FROM SELF-DEALING
While the relationship between a general and limited partner is, by tra-
dition, grounded in concepts of fiduciary duty,16 recent revisions to part-
nership law emphasized freedom of contract and the permissible waiver
of fiduciary protections, including the duties of care and loyalty and the
9. See Bradley J. Fikes, New Fund Aims at Health and Tech Companies, SAN DIEGO
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
10. See id.
11. See Steve Kam et al., The Market Pricing of Syndicated LPs and the Valuation of
FLPs (Family Limited Partnerships), TRUSTS AND ESTATES, Feb. 1, 1996.
12. Of course, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 shifted a common goal of limited partner-
ships from passive loss in the 1970s to active income in the 1990s. See id.; see generally
Todd Mason, Once-Reviled Partnerships on the Rebound, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Oct. 24, 1996, at B1.
13. See 59A AM. JUR. 2D, Partnership § 1231 (1987).
14. See id. §§ 1231, 1307.
15. See Mason, supra note 12, at Bi.
16. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Huffington v. Upchurch,
532 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976); Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 51
DELAWARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.17 The underlying rationale for
this doctrinal shift is that general partners need greater flexibility to take
entrepreneurial risks that will yield profit. 18 As a result, limited partners
are exposed to an unusual and perhaps hidden danger. Beyond the en-
trepreneurial risk of loss and failure that accompanies all business invest-
ments, limited partners may also face a risk of being squeezed-out and
denied the benefit for which they bargain because the enterprise achieves
a high level of success. As well, limited partners risk suffering dispropor-
tionately from the ill-effects of changing economic circumstances as gen-
eral partners seek to minimize their own loss by putting their own
interests first.
This Comment does not advocate greater protection for limited part-
ners. Indeed, a contractarian approach to business investment may well
yield greater economic success than a paternalistic one. Rather, this
Comment looks through the eyes of a prospective investor to examine
whether the freedom of contract, enjoyed by a general partner, imposes a
risk of loss that outweighs the potential for financial gain offered by the
limited partnership. The central inquiry is whether a limited partner can
adequately protect against the risk of entrusting money to a fiduciary who
may well be entitled to engage in conduct that defies traditional concepts
of fiduciary duty.
Considering the need for investment by limited partners, the answer to
this inquiry is one that affects the general partners' interests as well.
"[I]nvestors in limited partnership[s] ... have a limited incentive to invest
in entities that broadly and explicitly repudiate a duty of loyalty." 19 Thus,
if the risks are too great and investors are well-advised to seek more at-
tractive business ventures, the ill-effects of the contractarian approach
will reach the general partners rather than the investors who ultimately
pursue other financial opportunities.
The next section explores the history of fiduciary duty in the context of
limited partnerships. Tracing early obligations to subordinate the general
partners' interests beneath those of limited partners, the section examines
the modern debate between the concepts of fiduciary duty and freedom
of contract. That debate sets the stage for a discussion of Delaware law
and its strong commitment to contractarian principles.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE COMMON LAW
Any discussion concerning fiduciary duty must, and typically does, rely
17. See RUPA § 103(b) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101 (West Supp. 1996);
Alan W. Vestal, A Comprehensive Uniform Partnership Act? The Time Has Come, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1195, 1227-29 (1995).
18. See Leigh P. Ryan & Julie B. Salzman, Fiduciary Duties in a Limited Partnership
Merger or Asset Sale, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1992, at 10.
19. U.S. West, Inc. v. Time-Warner, Inc., No. 14555, 1996 LEXIS 55, at *68-70 (Del.
Ch. June 6, 1996).
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to some extent on Meinhard v. Salmon.20 It was there that Justice Car-
dozo pronounced that "the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and
supreme" where a party is vested with "exclusive powers of direction"
over the affairs of another.2' Cardozo further held that partners owe a
duty characterized "[n]ot [by] honesty alone, but [by] the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive .... -22
Without any statutory basis, 23 courts continued to hold general part-
ners liable as "full-fledged fiduciaries" based on the adoption of the law
of agency in the Uniform Partnership Act,24 and by analogy to the law
governing trusts.25 Absent from the common law and emerging statutes
was a clear standard for evaluating conduct.26
B. THE MODERN DEBATE
Two general views emerged to shape the modern debate over limited
partnership law. The first view holds that the relationship between gen-
eral and limited partners is fiduciary in nature.27 Under this view, general
partners may only engage in self-interested transactions where "the part-
ners clearly understand ex ante" that certain types of self-dealing transac-
tions might occur at the expense of the limited partnership. 28 Limited
partners may also give contemporaneous approval for previously unspeci-
fied acts of self-dealing. 29 According to Vestal, "[t]his world view forms
the foundation of current law as expressed in both the [Uniform Partner-
ship Act] and the common law of partnerships. '30
The second view holds that a relationship between general and limited
partners is contractarian in nature. 31 In contrast to the fiduciary view, the
contractarian view requires no advanced understanding on the part of
limited partners that a general partner might subordinate the limited
partnership's interests; nor does it require any contemporaneous notice
of specified acts of self-dealing. 32 Rather, the contractarian view main-
tains that general partners are free to engage in self-interested transac-
tions, unless the limited-partnership agreement provides otherwise. 33
20. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
21. Id. at 547-48.
22. Id. at 546.
23. See John C. Ale, Substantive Partnership Law: Special Problems of General and
Limited Partnerships, CA86 ALI-ABA 1, 33 (1996).
24. See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 425, 455-56 (1987).
25. See Editorial Comments of Prof. Alan R. Bromberg, January 1997 (on file with the
author).
26. See Hillman, supra note 24, at 455.
27. See Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the Revised Uniform
Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1993).
28. Id. at 523-24.







The contractarian view is based on concepts of liability and market
forces as mechanisms for regulating behavior and enforcing standards of
conduct. 34 Contractarians criticize the fiduciary view as "outmoded" and
shortsighted, and suggest that the development of "an optimal corporate
contract" depends not on government regulation, but on the discipline
demanded by a private market.35
C. THE UNIFORM ACTs
To fully explore the significance of Delaware law, it is necessary to first
examine the uniform and revised uniform acts that shape the body of law
governing limited partnerships. Both the Uniform Partnership Act
(UPA) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) govern rela-
tionships between general and limited partners.36 Each of the acts recog-
nizes a fiduciary duty owed by a general partner to a limited
partnership. 37 The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)
also recognizes that a general partner is accountable to a limited partner
as a fiduciary.38 The revised acts identify a duty of loyalty, 39 a duty of
care,40 and an obligation of good faith and fair dealing.41 Courts have
also upheld a duty of disclosure with respect to information needed by
limited partners to make informed decisions. 42
Even while recognizing fiduciary duties and obligations, RUPA ex-
pressly permits a general partner to modify the duties of care and loyalty
if the modifications are not "manifestly unreasonable. '43 RUPA also per-
mits a general partner to eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing by creating substitute standards of conduct, but again, only if
those standards are not "manifestly unreasonable. '44 What constitutes
34. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 71 (1990).
35. Id.
36. See RULPA § 403(a) (granting general partners in a limited partnership the same
rights as in a partnership without limited partners).
37. See UPA § 21(a) (a general partner is "accountable as a fiduciary"); RUPA § 404.
38. See RULPA § 403(a) (subjecting general partners of a limited partnership to the
same limitations as general partners in a partnership without limited partners).
39. See RUPA § 404(b) (duty to account to the limited partnership, act as trustee of its
property, and refrain from competing or acting on behalf of a party "having an interest
adverse to the partnership"); In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch.
1991); Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429 A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981).
40. See RUPA § 404(c) (duty to refrain from conducting the affairs of or winding up
the limited partnership in a manner that amounts to gross negligence, recklessness, inten-
tional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law); Trustees of Gen. Elec. Pension Trust
v. Levenson, No. 12014, 1992 LEXIS 43 (Del. Ch. March 3, 1992) (applying the standard of
gross negligence developed in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).
41. See RUPA § 404(d) (A general partner must discharge the duties to the partner-
ship and the limited partners and must exercise any rights granted to the general partner
under both RUPA and the partnership agreement consistent with the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing.).
42. See Trustees of Gen. Elec. Pension Trust, 1992 LEXIS 43; Litman v. Prudential-
Bache Properties, Inc., No. 12137, 1994 LEXIS 3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1994).
43. RUPA §§ 103 (b)(3), (b)(4).
44. See id. § 103(b)(5).
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"manifestly unreasonable" has not been determined by the courts.45 In
addition, RUPA expressly rejects any presumption that a general partner
violates the duties and obligations set forth in either the Act or the part-
nership agreement "merely because the [general] partner's conduct fur-
thers the [general] partner's own interest. '46
Both RUPA and RULPA are in effect, to some extent, in almost every
state.47 In light of this widespread acceptance of the revised acts, the next
section examines the continuing debate among proponents of con-
tractarian and fiduciary views, and the direction of limited partnership
law. It also examines Delaware's version of RULPA and the effect of
RUPA on limited partnership law in general. Finally, the next section
explores possible alternatives to fiduciary safeguards to determine
whether investors can find stable ground on which to base investment
decisions as contractarian principles gain influence over the body of lim-
ited partnership statutes and decisions.
III. THE DEBATE CONTINUES
A. THE DIRECTION OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LAW
Since Meinhard v. Salmon, partnership law has adopted neither the fi-
duciary nor the contractarian view, but has vacillated somewhere toward
the middle of these two extremes. In fact, the common law continues to
search for that delicate balance between "flexibility and fidelity."'48
While the courts have long held that a general partner clearly owes fiduci-
ary duties to a limited partner,4 9 the extent to which a general partner's
fiduciary duties may be modified by contract is unclear.50 Provisions au-
thorizing self-dealing are not "ipso facto impermissible," but are subject
to good faith standards. 51 Once again, however, it is unclear exactly what
is meant by good faith.
In Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 52 the court approved a self-
dealing transaction because a prospectus issued to prospective investors
suggested that self-dealing might occur. The court found this was suffi-
cient notice to the limited partners, despite the absence of any expression
of notice in the limited-partnership agreement.5 3 In so holding, the court
demonstrated a willingness to look beyond the four corners of a limited-
partnership agreement to condone a general partner's act of self-dealing.
In contrast, courts are less willing to consider extrinsic evidence to rem-
45. See Discussion with Prof. Alan R. Bromberg, February 1997.
46. RUPA § 404(e).
47. See Robert B. Robbins, Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Corporate General Part-
ners to Limited Partnerships, CA65 ALI-ABA 87, 92 (1996).
48. Konover Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 809 (Conn. 1994).
49. See Klein v. Weiss, 395 A.2d 126, 139 (Md. 1978).
50. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP LAW, § 6.07, at 6:161 (1997).
51. Riviera Congress Assoc. v. Yassky, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880 (N.Y. 1966).
52. See id.
53. See id.; BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:156-57 n.136.
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edy or punish self-dealing acts where the limited-partnership agreement
contains seemingly permissive language. For example, in Furman v. Cir-
rito,54 a federal court upheld a general partner's self-dealing transaction
by refusing to consider extrinsic evidence that self-dealing was inconsis-
tent with the parties' agreement-in-fact. The court held that the terms of
the limited-partnership agreement superseded any fiduciary obligations
arising from any prior discussions or agreements.
Thus, even though fiduciary obligations are "more intense" in a limited
partnership because the investors are passive,55 modern courts are influ-
enced by secondary authority that supports greater flexibility to contract
away fiduciary obligations owed by general partners to limited partners.56
Relying on these secondary sources, the Connecticut Supreme Court ex-
pressed concern over the imposition of strong fiduciary protections:
We agree with the thrust of these commentaries that, in general, in
the context of a commercial limited partnership the fiduciary rela-
tionship must be flexible enough to ensure that partners with diverse
interests will be able to craft and rely on a partnership agreement
that reflects their common interests. The law should recognize that
an overly strict interpretation of partnership loyalty might stifle the
limited partnership form, and enable a limited partner to exploit its
status as beneficiary to hold a general partner hostage to the
partnership. 57
B. FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND DELAWARE'S "MAXIMUM EFFECT"
There is a historical basis for concluding that fiduciary duties serve as
default principles in the absence of express contract provisions permitting
self-dealing transactions by a general partner, 58 and these common law
principles have been codified in many jurisdictions. While the revised
model acts offer general partners relief from these common-law obliga-
tions, the Delaware RULPA provides general partners with even greater
freedom to engage in self-dealing acts that are harmful to limited partner-
ship interests.
For example, title 6, section 17-1101(c) of the Delaware Code declares
it the policy of the Delaware RULPA to give "maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership
agreements. ' 59 As this Comment will demonstrate, Delaware's "maxi-
mum effect" policy is construed broadly against fiduciary-default princi-
ples that were prevalent at common law.
While conferring great legal significance upon contractual language
written by general partners, the Delaware RULPA also invites general
partners to contractually restrict fiduciary obligations owed to the limited
54. 828 F.2d 898, 901 (2d Cir. 1987).
55. BROMBERG & RIBSmIN, supra note 50, at 6:114.
56. See id. at 6:153-54.
57. Konover Dev. Corp., 635 A.2d at 809.
58. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:157.
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17.1101(c) (West 1997).
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partnership.60 Moreover, the Delaware RULPA provides a safe harbor
to shield general partners from liability when they rely in "good faith" on
that language as a basis for disregarding fiduciary obligations.61
Therefore, when deciding disputes arising from limited-partnership
agreements organized under Delaware law, courts are required to give
"maximum effect to the principles of freedom of contract, '62 thus al-
lowing general partners to act in a manner inconsistent "with the com-
mon law duties of a fiduciary" where the limited-partnership agreement
is interpreted as modifying that responsibility.63
Further, courts may not violate the safe harbor provision of the Dela-
ware RULPA to reach general partners who act in "good faith" reliance
on their agreement, even where the general partner's self-dealing "might
otherwise be questionable or impose a stricter standard of scrutiny than
the norm."'64 Contrary to contractarian concerns that RUPA and RULPA
expanded fiduciary obligations by explicitly recognizing them, the Dela-
ware RULPA has increased the risk of harmful self-dealing by allowing
general partners to define the parameters of fiduciary duties in the con-
tractual setting of a limited-partnership agreement. 65
Critics see a problem with increasing the level of permitted harm with-
out defining that which constitutes "good faith."'66 For the sake of pro-
moting efficiency, critics say, such statutes leave courts with an
ambiguous standard of good faith that fails to rise along with the relative
power of the general partner.67 By apparently prohibiting only conduct
deemed to be egregious, critics say, such an approach is "at variance with
both the continuum and tradition" of limited partnership law. 68
Consistent with that criticism, some commentators emphasize the rele-
vance of bargaining power and the sophistication of the parties, sug-
gesting that waivers of fiduciary duties should be enforced only "where
there is direct and equal dealing between the partners[,] ... the waiver is
explicit[,] and there are no equitable reasons for nonenforcement in the
given case."'69
60. See id. § 17-1101(d)(2).
61. See id. § 17-1101(d)(1); United States Cellular Inv. Co. v. Bell Atlantic Mobile
Sys., Inc., 677 A.2d 497, 504 (Del. 1996).
62. In re Paine Webber Ltd. Partnerships, No. 15043, 1996 WL 535403, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 17, 1996). Section 17-1101 indicates that "It is the policy of this chapter to give maxi-
mum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership
agreements." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c) (West 1997).
63. Davenport Group MG, L.P. v. Strategic Inv. Partners, Inc., 685 A.2d 715, 721 (Del.
Ch. 1996).
64. In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P. Litigation, No. 14634, 1996 LEXIS 17
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1996).
65. See James River-Pennington, Inc. v. CRSS Capital Inc., No. 13870, 1995 WL
106554 (Del. Ch. March 6, 1995).
66. See Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking Glass: Good Faith, Fiduci-
ary Duty, and Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1995).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. BROMBERG & RIBs kiN, supra note 50, at 6:161.
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While other states take a more moderate approach to the con-
tractarian-fiduciary debate, Delaware is the only one to expand RULPA
to include this unique and far-reaching "maximum effect" policy, 70
thereby giving general partners a higher degree of flexibility and protec-
tion from liability. The next section takes a step back to explore RUPA's
influence on the contractarian-fiduciary debate more generally. The sec-
tion also explores RUPA's role in defining fiduciary obligations owed by
general partners and looks at the risk and uncertainty that arise for lim-
ited partners out of the revised act.
C. THE EFFECT OF RUPA 71
With respect to RUPA's effect on limited partnership law, there are
two competing views: one suggesting that RUPA is a departure from
prior law because it weakens fiduciary obligations, 72 and another sug-
gesting that RUPA increases the level of fiduciary duties owed by a gen-
eral partner.7 3 In the course of evaluating the present state of limited
partnership law, conclusions as to which analysis is correct may differ
among jurisdictions. Limited partnership law is an evolving body of stat-
ute and case law, influenced by four model acts-each of which may, to
varying degrees, be in effect in a particular jurisdiction.
While RUPA has influenced the direction of limited partnership law,74
using the revised act as a guide for prospective analysis may offer little
certainty for limited partners. Indeed, RUPA is open to criticism for fail-
ing to reconcile the principles of fiduciary obligation and freedom of con-
tract. The failure to reconcile these competing principles generates
uncertainty and confusion in the search for stable ground on which to
base investment decisions. Indeed, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein
criticize RUPA's lack of clarity in their analysis of section 404(b)(2):
RUPA § 404(b)(2) provides for a specific duty to refrain from "deal-
ing with the partnership . . . as or on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the partnership." Because the language of UPA
§ 21 is included in RUPA § 404(b)(1) without specifying how subsec-
tion (b)(2) relates to subsection (b)(1), it is not clear how, if at all,
the new provision affects existing law.75
Further sources of confusion are subsections 404(e)-(f), which pro-
vide, respectively, that a partner does not violate a duty or obligation
merely by furthering his own interest and may transact business with
the partnership on the same basis as a third party "subject to applica-
ble law." It is not clear how these provisions interact with the rest of
§ 404. The provisions seem to contradict the duty to act selflessly
70. See Comments of Prof. Alan R. Bromberg, Letter of July 1, 1997 (on file with the
author).
71. Recall that RULPA § 403(a) looks to RUPA to define the rights and obligations of
general partners in a limited partnership. See RULPA § 403(a).
72. See Dickerson, supra note 66, at 1004.
73. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:150.
74. See Dickerson, supra note 66, at 1004; Bromberg, supra note 70.
75. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:125.
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under § 404(b)(2). 76
Professors Bromberg and Ribstein further observed additional points
of confusion concerning the duty of loyalty and obligation of good faith:
RUPA is also perverse even in its limited authorization of waivers.
RUPA permits "specific types or categories of activities" covered by
duty-of-loyalty waivers and agreed "standards" for measuring the
performance of the good faith obligation that "are not manifestly un-
reasonable." . . . These qualifications are so vague that sophisticated
planners would be foolish to rely on them, but are sure to enmesh in
litigation unfortunate partners who attempt private ordering of fidu-
ciary duties.77
While this analysis warns of uncertainty for general partners, it also
forewarns prospective investors considering the limited partnership form
of investment. The concept of limited partnership involves relinquishing
control of large sums of money and placing trust in a general partner to
nurture that investment and return to the limited partner his fair share of
the profits. If fiduciary duties are not required to watch over a general
partner's conduct, on what alternative safeguards can limited partners de-
pend to minimize the risk that a general partner might deny them the
benefit for which they bargain?
D. ALTERNATIVES TO FIDUCIARY SAFEGUARDS
One suggestion is that market forces will protect limited partners be-
cause "general partners must run the firm carefully to avoid personal lia-
bility," thereby lessening the need for limited partners to obtain fiduciary
guarantees.78 "[Tlhis argument fails," according to Ribstein, because per-
sonal liability "has little effect on the general partners' incentives to self-
deal, for example, by taking partnership opportunities or excessive
compensation. '79
The sophistication of investors and the availability of expert advice rep-
resents another alternative to fiduciary safeguards. However, Ribstein
rejects the argument that limited partners are among a more sophisti-
cated class of investors able to understand complex deals and to benefit
from the advice of qualified business advisors. 80 To the contrary, the
complex nature of limited partnership deals may conceal, rather than
alert, investors to waivers of fiduciary duties in limited partnerships. 81
"The supposed problem is not that investors are unsophisticated, but that
there is 'a fundamental problem of asymmetric information' because in-
vestors cannot predict the extent of the conduct that the waiver may
76. Id. at 6:116.
77. Id. at 6:161-62.
78. Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partnership and
its Implications for Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 304 (1991).
79. Id.





The ability to exit a limited partnership might also present an alterna-
tive to fiduciary safeguards were it not for the illiquidity inherent in this
type of investment. Few limited partnership interests find a ready mar-
ket, which would allow for the easy or quick transfer of interests.83
Therefore, Ribstein rejects the notion that market forces can effectively
guide the conduct of general partners.84
Bound by contract to a self-dealing general partner., limited partners
may be trapped without recourse. 85 Unable to adequately negotiate for
provisions that protect against harmful self-dealing, and unable to trans-
fer their interest to another willing investor, the only alternative left for a
limited partner might be the removal of the general partner by vote or
court order. Here again, however, limited partners face another obstacle:
the high costs inherent in removing a general partner.
To remove a general partner, it is necessary to buy out or compen-
sate the partner for the partner's ownership rights. In addition, the
general partner probably will insist ex ante on a right to discharge of
the partner's guarantee of partnership debts in the event of removal.
This discharge may necessitate satisfying obligations owed to credi-
tors and therefore selling important assets .... [T]he partners may
need to replace the guarantee lost by removal of the general partner.
In particular, if the partnership had only one general partner, it must
either replace that partner, dissolve, or continue as a general part-
nership. Without an effective power to remove the general partners,
the limited partners lose an important constraint on the general part-
ners' actions. As a result, the fiduciary duty constraint becomes
more important.8 6
The history and evolution of limited partnership law offers an unclear
picture of how best to safeguard the benefit for which an investor bar-
gains upon entering a limited partnership. In the absence of broad fiduci-
ary language, counsel for an investor would be challenged to draft a
limited-partnership agreement that anticipates the many ways general
partners may circumvent their fiduciary obligations. The next section of
this Comment will examine recent and significant court decisions that
continue to shape the law that governs relationships between general and
limited partners. The section will also explore circumstances in which un-
anticipated self-dealing is viewed by courts as bargained-for freedom pro-
vided to general partners under limited-partnership agreements.
Particular attention should be given to the low level of fiduciary protec-
tion afforded under Delaware law, even where disputes are litigated in
courts outside of Delaware. These cases serve as notice to investors that
82. Id.
83. See id. at 306.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 309.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
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different states offer different levels of fiduciary protection, and that Del-
aware law provides very little protection from harmful self-dealing.
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. THE SEARCH FOR CERTAINTY
While much of the debate over fiduciary duties focuses on contract
provisions that permit self-dealing, most limited-partnership agreements
lack specificity and only broadly define the rights, duties, and liabilities of
a general partner. 87 Where a limited-partnership agreement does not ad-
equately or clearly define the general partner's fiduciary duties, Delaware
courts, in particular, have shifted toward the contractarian view.88
In Froemming v. Gate City Federal Savings & Loan Association,8 9 the
court applied general fiduciary duties despite a broad provision in the
partnership agreement that permitted Delaware partners to engage in
other business and to benefit from the partnership without accounting to
the partnership. However, under current Delaware statutes, Froemming
may no longer be good law, depending on what the general partner has
done.90
In 1988, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein observed that "there is
some authority for nonenforcement or incomplete enforcement of [waiv-
ers relating to a general partner's duty of loyalty] in the corporate and
limited partner context." 91 In 1995, however, the two commentators
noted that "[a] recent amendment to the Delaware limited partnership
statute [giving maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract
and to the enforceability of partnership agreements] may signal a reversal
of this authority. '92
Delaware courts, which follow the contractarian approach to a greater
degree than other courts, 93 have adopted a factual presumption that gen-
eral partners standing on both sides of a transaction must certainly have
bargained for such a position. 94 Parties may modify "traditional notions
87. See Ryan & Salzman, supra note 18, at 10.
88. See id. A number of states are more protective of fiduciary duties. See BROM-
BERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:163 (citing Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir.
1991) (under Massachusetts law, contract providing that "[g]eneral partners shall not be
prevented from engaging in other activities for profit, whether in research and develop-
ment or otherwise, and whether or not competitive with the business of the partnership"
did not permit partner to purchase interests of investors in related company)); TriGrowth
Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1989)
(contract authorizing partners to compete with partnership did not exonerate partner's use
of confidential information against partnership, including his knowledge that partnership
would not be able to close the deal soon, or his misleading seller into thinking that partner-
ship thought property was too expensive).
89. 822 F.2d 723, 730 n.l (8th Cir. 1987).
90. See Ribstein, supra note 78, at 299, 301 n.9.
91. BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:161.
92. Id. at 6:160.
93. See Bromberg, supra note 70.
94. See In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P. Litig., No. 14634, 1996 LEXIS 17
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1996).
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of fiduciary duty" and redefine "the parameters of due care."' 95 Holding
that contract terms control in the absence of allegations of fraudulent
inducement, the court in In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P. Liti-
gation refused to grant injunctive relief to stop the sale of partnership
assets to the general partner, even though the general partner stood on
both sides of the transaction. 96 Organized under Delaware law, the part-
nership agreement obligated the general partner to liquidate the partner-
ship's assets by a specified date, and it made no express provision for the
limited partners to object to the manner in which the general partner
fulfilled this obligation. The limited partners also alleged that the general
partner failed to disclose material facts relevant to the liquidation provi-
sion, but the court did not view those omissions as fraudulent induce-
ments warranting injunctive relief.97
Furthermore, Delaware courts assume that limited partners pay dis-
counted prices in exchange for giving a general partner the contractual
right to act in conflict with traditional concepts of fiduciary duty.98 Thus,
the court will allow a general partner to stand on both sides of a sale of
assets without seeking the most favorable price for the partnership
property. 99
Even where a contract provision allowing self-dealing is not reason-
able, Delaware does not hold a general partner liable for breach of the
duty of loyalty and allows for an effective denial of any benefit for which
a limited partner has bargained. The general partner is required only to
act with a good faith belief that his conduct is permissible under the lim-
ited-partnership agreement.10° Relying on Delaware law, the court in
United States Cellular Investment Co. of Allentown v. Bell Atlantic Mobile
System, Inc.101 held that, under circumstances involving such good faith
belief, self-dealing is allowed, and the general partner is "shielded from
liability for breach of fiduciary duty" even though self-dealing occurred
to the detriment of limited partners.10 2 In that case, the plaintiffs' com-
plaint alleged that the general partner "willfully failed and refused to
share the right to provide cellular services in New Jersey" with the limited
partners. 10 3 The Court of Chancery's decision to dismiss the fiduciary
duty claim was upheld on grounds that the complaint merely asserted that
the general partner intentionally, rather than knowingly, breached the
agreement. 104
95. Id.
96. See id. at *13.
97. See id.
98. See In re Marriott Hotel Properties II Ltd. Partnership Unitholders Litig., No.
14961, 1996 LEXIS 60, at *21-23 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1996).
99. See id.
100. See United States Cellular Inv. Co., 677 A.2d at 504; In re Mesa Ltd. Partnership
Preferred Unitholders Litig., No. 12243, 1991 LEXIS 214 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1991).
101. 677 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1996).





Further, in U.S. West, Inc. v. Time Warner, Inc.,10 5 the court held that
limited partnerships are amenable to greater freedom of contract that
may include the waiver of fiduciary duties.10 6 Absent a defect in the bar-
gaining process, such as fraud, non-disclosure, or manipulation, "explic-
itly negotiated and validly adopted provisions [waiving fiduciary duties]
will be enforced. ' 10 7
Thus, it seems that prospective investors are left with a high-level of
uncertainty with respect to how a general partner can be restrained from
self-dealing. Indeed, recent case law suggests that the most difficult part
of a limited partner's burden of proof may be to demonstrate a defect in
the bargaining process, which is the only exception noted by the court
above.108
B. APPLYING THE LAW: MORE UNCERTAINTY
1. The Risk of Fraudulent Inducement
Consider the following situation. An entrepreneur engaged in a restau-
rant and hotel business approaches an experienced, out-of-state general
partner wishing to establish a riverboat gambling operation. The state
legislature recently passed a law allowing for such enterprises, and the
entrepreneur is an influential member of the community, capable of ob-
taining the necessary political support to gain the required local approval.
He also has the ability to supply a portion of the seed money needed to
start the enterprise, but wishes to work with someone experienced in run-
ning casinos.
Both parties understand that, while the entrepreneur will get a small
percentage of the business, his primary motive for joining the enterprise
is to expand his own restaurant and hotel business by serving the pro-
posed casino. The general partner promises that, in the event of success,
the entrepreneur will also obtain hospitality contracts for additional casi-
nos upon expansion of the limited partnership.
The entrepreneur is successful in gaining local political support and
subsequent government approval for the new enterprise. The general
partner accepts a substantive investment from the entrepreneur, and a
Delaware limited partnership is formed. However, when it comes time to
sign the limited-partnership agreement, the general partner explains that
the portion of the agreement detailing the entrepreneur's hospitality con-
tract will be covered by a second document that has not yet been drafted,
and the entrepreneur is asked to sign the part of the agreement that is
ready.
Despite the absence of a written guarantee and the presence of provi-
sions permitting self-dealing on the part of the limited partner, the entre-
105. No. CIV.A.14555, 1996 LEXIS 55 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996).
106. See id. at *69.
107. Id. at *70.
108. See id. at *76.
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preneur signs the limited-partnership agreement. The limited-
partnership agreement provides the investor with a five-percent interest
in the limited partnership and a five-percent interest in the corporate gen-
eral partner, but it fails to mention the promised hospitality contract,
which served as the true basis of the bargain. On the one hand, the entre-
preneur has every reason to believe that the general partner is dealing in
good faith and has no reason to believe that the general partner would
conduct himself in a manner inconsistent with traditional fiduciary con-
cepts. Additionally, the entrepreneur is concerned about upsetting rela-
tions with the general partner and does not want to jeopardize the plan
under which the entrepreneur will be awarded the hospitality contract for
this and future casinos.
Some time passes, and the general partner has yet to offer the second
document. The entrepreneur, now a limited partner, is concerned that
the general partner may not fulfill his promise. In the meantime, the gen-
eral partner has welcomed a second general partner into the enterprise.
As new assets are brought in and the limited partnership grows in
value, the general partner approaches the entrepreneur seeking a modifi-
cation of their agreement. The general partner wishes to reduce the en-
trepreneur's share of the business such that it does not grow in value with
any increase in assets. Worried that the general partner may renege on
the hospitality contract, which is a comparatively greater concern than
the small percentage of the business he owns, the entrepreneur agrees to
the modification.
In the end, the general partner decides not to give the hospitality con-
tract to the entrepreneur. The general partner then uses partnership as-
sets to form a new limited partnership with the second general partner for
the purpose of expanding the river boat gambling enterprise in other
states. The entrepreneur is not invited to participate in the expansion,
either as a limited partner or with respect to hospitality services. The
general partner has acted in a manner consistent with the limited-partner-
ship agreement.
In this situation, the limited partner has expended time and money to
make the enterprise a success. In fact, as an entrepreneur, time spent is
money lost. As an attorney, one might see a valid cause of action against
the general partner. The general partner appears to have fraudulently
induced the limited partner to sign a partnership agreement that includes
provisions allowing self-dealing. Throughout the relationship, the general
partner held out a proverbial carrot, the hospitality contract, to induce
the investor to agree to the terms of the limited-partnership agreement.
Recall that in U.S. West the court held that such fraudulent inducement
would render any contractual waiver of fiduciary duty invalid and unen-
forceable. 10 9 It is, however, difficult to predict how a court would rule on
a breach of fiduciary duty claim in this case, due to the lack of clarity in
109. See id. at *70.
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limited partnership law. While one might predict a victory for the entre-
preneur, the facts of this situation met with the opposite result from the
court in Whalen v. Connelly.110 Applying Delaware law, the Iowa
Supreme Court upheld self-dealing provisions of the partnership agree-
ment.111 The general partner effectively contracted his way out of any
fiduciary obligation to disclose interests in competing activities, and was
thus permitted to act contrary to the duty of loyalty.112 The court also
refused to consider the limited partner's claim that he had entered into an
effective "oral partnership" with the general partner, holding that "the
written contract must be viewed as superseding any prior oral agreement
by application of the integration clause and the parol-evidence rule."
113
Additionally, the court rejected the limited partner's claim of fraudu-
lent inducement because the alleged representations were addressed in
the integration clause and because the limited partner agreed to modify
the contract at the request of the general partner. 114 The court held that
where "a person with knowledge of a potential fraud enters into a new
agreement concerning the same subject matter, he waives his claim to
fraud in the original transaction. '1 15 Ultimately, the decision relied on
the Delaware court's holding in Citadel Holding Co. v. Roven.
116
Moreover, the Whalen court emphasized the intent of the parties while
actually using rules of contract construction to ignore the parties' intent,
even though fraud was alleged. 117 Such a result seems inconsistent with
the concepts of fair dealing and equal-bargaining power that form the
basis of the contractarian view.
2. The Risk of Changing Circumstances
Inconsistent and unpredictable results can also be found in Adler v.
William Blair & Co.,118 where investors were invited to participate in a
limited partnership in order to derive tax benefits. The limited partner-
ship was formed as a source of passive-investment loss to offset taxes
owed on sources of active-investment gain held by investors. 119 Under
the partnership agreement, the enterprise would purchase property and
the limited partners would deduct the depreciation expense of that prop-
erty from their personal taxable income. 120 In exchange, the general
partners would collect fees for managing the properties.
121
110. 545 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Iowa 1996).
111. See id. at 291.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 293.
114. See id. at 294.
115. Id.
116. 603 A.2d 818, 822 (Del. 1992).
117. See Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 284.
118. 648 N.E.2d 226 (II1. App. Ct. 1995).




As with any business venture, the purpose of the limited partnership
was to reap profits for the investors. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1986, it was profitable for the partnership to acquire rapidly depreciating
property. 122 With tax reform, however, depreciation expenses could no
longer be used to offset tax liability for other sources of income. 123
Despite this dramatic change in the federal tax code, the general part-
ner continued to purchase property suffering from declining value in or-
der to profit from the collection of management fees. 124 The result was
that the limited partners were now tied to a losing investment under a
partnership agreement that allowed the general partner to engage in self-
interested transactions. 125 Because the limited partnership was now a
losing enterprise for the limited partners, they lacked any real exit option,
as it would be difficult to find another interested investor.
The limited partners filed suit claiming that the general partner
breached his fiduciary duty by failing to react to changes in the tax
code.126 Indeed, the general partner appears to have committed an egre-
gious breach of the duty of loyalty because his conflict of interest could
easily have been resolved by purchasing fee-generating properties bene-
fitting from rising value. Thus, the general partner rejected an option for
resolving a conflict between his own interests and the interests of the lim-
ited partners, instead consciously and perhaps needlessly harming the
limited partners.
The court held that the general partner breached no fiduciary duty. 27
The decision was based on factual findings that the limited partners knew,
before investing, that the partnership sought to purchase depreciating
properties and that the tax code might soon change.128 The court charac-
terized the plaintiffs' complaint as demanding that the general partner
"abandon the primary purpose of the partnership in the face of tax law
changes. 112 9 Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the court itself recog-
nized that it was not the primary purpose of the enterprise to generate
"reasonable Partnership tax losses from straight-line real estate deprecia-
tion to offset or 'shelter' a Unit holder's taxable income from other
sources.' 130 According to the court, the "primary investment objective"
was to "locate and acquire suitable real estate properties and obtain capi-
tal appreciation through an increase in the value of the Properties.' 3'
The court's statements seem to support the limited partner's claim rather
than the general partner's defense. For if the primary objective was to
acquire suitable property, and the tax code changed the definition of




126. See id. at 231.




131. Id. at 235-36 (emphasis added).
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"suitable property" making depreciating property no longer suitable, then
the secondary objective of acquiring depreciating property should have
been subsumed by the primary objective of obtaining capital appreciation
through an increase in the value of the properties.
The court's holding is especially surprising when considered in the con-
text of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which "contained important changes
[that] profoundly affected the market for limited partnership inter-
ests."' 32 In a recent article, one group of commentators captured the
plight of limited partners trapped in such investments:
Significantly, active income, which included an individual's wages,
could no longer be offset by passive losses from [limited partner-
ships]; the lure of using the losses from a limited partnership to offset
other income basically disappeared over the next few years. Yet the
partnerships continued to be managed by general partners interested
in perpetuating their stream of management fees, at the same time
creating passive losses which investors were loath to do anything
[about] due to the potential tax liability from recapturing
depreciation 133
It is reasonable for investors to have assumed that general partners
would react to changing law for the benefit of the partnership, and it is
difficult to imagine how they could have foreseen and prevented such a
risk. True, the limited partners were warned that the tax benefit could be
eliminated by changing law,' 34 but they received no warning that the gen-
eral partner would purchase properties harmful to their interests. Thus,
the holding in this case leaves the legal environment for limited-partner-
ship investment less clear and less predictable.
3. The Risk of Too Much Profit
The legal environment for investing in limited partnerships is made no
more clear by the holding in Katell v. Morgan Stanley Group, Inc.135 The
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that their general partners were in
breach of fiduciary duties when conducting two self-dealing transactions
that benefitted the managing general partners' affiliates to the financial
detriment of the limited partners. The court "decline[d] to undertake an
independent review of the merits of plaintiffs' claims," 136 relying instead
on the judgment of a special litigation committee composed of members
of the corporate general partner, which determined that "continuing [the]
derivative action was not in the best interests of the partnership."' 137
132. Kam, supra note 11, at 40.
133. Id.
134. See Adler, 648 N.E.2d at 236.
135. No. CIV.A.12343, 1995 WL 376952 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995).
136. Id. at *13.
137. Id. at *5. In so deciding, the court said it would "not linger over all the details
criticized by the Plaintiffs, but base [its] decision on [its] overall impression of the Commit-
tee's good faith and the reasonableness of its investigation." Id. at *9.
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In 1985, twenty-two limited partners invested $2 million each into the
Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, L.P. The entity was created
under Delaware law by Morgan Stanley and CIGNA Corporation to
identify and invest in limited partnership opportunities. 138 The partner-
ship agreement designated Morgan Stanley Leveraged Capital Fund, Inc.
(Morgan Stanley LCF) as the managing general partner, and required
approval for many decisions from CIGNA LCF, which the agreement
also designated as a general partner. Also under the agreement, all in-
vestment decisions with respect to leveraged buy-out opportunities re-
quired a majority vote of a management committee consisting of three
appointees from each general partner. 139 The partnership agreement also
allowed for self-dealing transactions by a general partner, but only if one
of the general partners had no interest in, and subsequently approved of,
the transaction. 140 Thus, an alternative to fiduciary protection in this in-
stance would be the self-interest of the general partner who is disinter-
ested in the transaction. In other words, the disinterested general partner
would not normally sacrifice its own interests by approving the other gen-
eral partner's self-interested transaction.
The limited partnership invested in two leveraged buy-out opportuni-
ties, the Container Corporation of America (CCA) and Silgan Corpora-
tion. Later, the general partners sold the partnership's interest in both
corporations to affiliates of Morgan Stanley. As a result, the plaintiffs
alleged, the affiliates were able to purchase the companies at a substantial
and unfair discount. The court discussed the plaintiffs' complaint with
skepticism due to the level of profit generated by the sale: "Although
both transactions produced handsome profits for the limited partners of
Fund I, Katell and Desert Equities141 contend that the returns may have
been $15 million greater had Morgan Stanley affiliates not stood on both
sides of the transaction."'142 The court continued to express skepticism in
its summary of procedural events:
Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the price [the limited partnership] re-
ceived for its shares in the CCA and Silgan transactions. Although
[the limited partnership] earned enormous returns on its investments
in these companies, Plaintiffs believe that Morgan Stanley unfairly
limited their gains by selling the investments to [another of its own
limited partnerships] for less than they were worth. 143
Thus, from the beginning, the court reveals its lack of sympathy for
limited partners who demand not just a large measure of profit in return
for their investment, but the full measure of the profit for which they
bargained. In essence, the court's language suggests that when a limited
partner's profit becomes sizeable, self-dealing becomes less significant. It
138. See id. at *1.
139. See id.
140. See id. at *5.
141. Two limited partners who brought the claim against Morgan Stanley and CIGNA.
142. Katell, 1995 WL 376952, at *1.
143. Id. at *4.
1997]
SMU LAW REVIEW
seems that the court is creating a sliding scale of justice, whereby a gen-
eral partner is permitted to siphon-off a portion of the limited partners'
rightful share of the profit. This reasoning gives rise to an important
question: Why is a general partner entitled to a disproportionate share of
the profit when he assumed no greater entrepreneurial risk than the lim-
ited partners?
The court avoids this issue using a judicial slight-of-hand in which it
recharacterizes the transaction as one approved by disinterested general
partners. 44 While acknowledging that Morgan Stanley stood on both
sides of the transaction, the court viewed the sale and purchase as merely
"a good way to invest this capital. ' 145 Attempting to minimize CIGNA's
interest in the transaction, however, the court reveals CIGNA's motive as
one concerned with self-interest rather than with the interests of the part-
nership and limited partners: "CIGNA believed that selling the assets...
was a good way to 'divorce' Morgan Stanley. . . [so it] approved the
offers ... without asking for a higher bid." 146
As well, the court's recharacterization also seems unconvincing in light
of other facts in the case. For instance, when the limited-partnership
agreement was signed, it did not permit the creation of a special litigation
committee to review pending derivative litigation. It was after the com-
plaint was filed that the general partners drafted an amendment to the
partnership agreement authorizing the use of a special litigation commit-
tee consisting of disinterested appointees to decide whether the plaintiffs'
action should go forward. Without specifying exactly who would be ap-
pointed to serve on the committee, the amendment won approval from
nineteen of the twenty-two limited partners. However, the general part-
ners then appointed CIGNA as the sole member of the litigation commit-
tee. CIGNA employees recommended dismissal, concluding that the
plaintiffs' lawsuit was not in the best interests of the limited partner-
ship. 147 It was only through a serious of post-agreement maneuvers that
the general partners obtained permission to allow CIGNA to review the
complaint, and the general partners' actions in obtaining that permission
seem to fall short of satisfying fiduciary obligations not waived under the
original agreement.
Additionally, the court refused to give weight to the ongoing series of
disagreements between CIGNA and Morgan Stanley as a motive for
CIGNA's approval of the transaction. 148 The court's analysis also paid
little consideration to CIGNA's expressed desire to wind up the affairs of
the limited partnership and dissolve this aspect of its relationship with
Morgan Stanley. In addition, the court dismissed as irrelevant the plain-
tiffs' assertion that CIGNA could not act against Morgan Stanley's best
144. See id. at *5.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id.
147. See id. at *5.
148. See id. at *6-8.
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interest because of "longstanding business ties" between the two compa-
nies.149 The court viewed the companies' ongoing disagreements over the
management of the limit partnership as evidence of CIGNA's willingness
to act against Morgan Stanley, rather than a motive for CIGNA's ap-
proval of an unfair transaction that would free it from the venture.1 50
Further, the court deemed CIGNA's willingness to lose profit along with
the limited partners as proof that CIGNA "did not stand to benefit from
these transactions at the expense of the partnership." 151 This analysis,
however, ignores the strong possibility that CIGNA was willing to pay
such a price for its "divorce" from a troublesome partnership with Mor-
gan Stanley, and to ensure that the venture did not destroy a long-stand-
ing and profitable relationship between the companies.
Even more bothersome is the court's willingness to ignore the differ-
ences between shareholders and limited partners.152 By applying rulings
pertaining to disputes between shareholders and corporate boards of di-
rectors, 5 3 the court used the business-judgment rule to review the actions
of a general partner with far greater control and authority than a corpo-
rate director. Consistent with Delaware law,154 the court also extended
the Aronson ruling from its original corporate context to find that a gen-
eral partner, faced with liability, may excuse his own self-interested ac-
tion by deciding to bar derivative litigation initiated by dissatisfied
limited partners. Following the court's reasoning here, it is difficult to
imagine how an investor in a Delaware limited partnership could ever be
assured of recourse for derivative harm, 155 such as the selling of partner-
ship assets, even where the general partner acts in violation of express
provisions of a limited-partnership agreement.
Ultimately, the court found that CIGNA acted in good faith because
the employees it appointed to the special litigation committee provided
"fresh sets of eyes ... to review the merits of [the] claim[ ].,156 Again
suggesting that the limited partners should be happy with the return re-
ceived on their investment, the court discounted the plaintiffs' concern
over the bias with which the CIGNA employees came to the
investigation:
149. See id. at *7.
150. See id. at *8.
151. Id. at *7.
152. See BROMBERG & RIBsI mI, supra note 50, § 1.01(b)(2), (3).
153. In reaching its decision, the Katell court relied on Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 817 (Del. 1984) (holding
that director's potential liability does not excuse demand on the board of directors). See
Katell, 1995 WL 376952, at *5-7.
154. See id. at *12.
155. Meaning "any action brought by one or more limited partners of a limited partner-
ship to enforce a limited partnership's right or to prevent or remedy a wrong to the limited
partnership where the general partner.., fails or refuses to do so." Debra E. Wax, Anno-
tation, Right of a Limited Partner to Maintain Derivative Action on Behalf of Partnership,
26 A.L.R.4H 264, 266 (1983).
156. Katell, 1995 WL 376952, at *10.
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[I]t is not surprising that [the CIGNA employees] heard favorable
descriptions about deals that brought 50-to-1 and 14-to-1 returns on
investment. These men worked in the same division of CIGNA as
the persons involved in CIGNA LCF [and the limited partnership],
but that does not reflect that CIGNA LCF selected them in bad
faith.157
Again, the court is analogizing the special litigation committee to the
type used by corporate boards of directors and often composed of disin-
terested directors. The partnership agreement itself permitted self-deal-
ing "subject to applicable law,"'1 58 and Delaware courts apply corporate
fiduciary duty principles in the limited-partnership context. 159
However, it is important to note a significant distinction between a
general partner and a corporate board of directors. The board may, in-
deed, have a variety of interests among directors, some interested and
others disinterested in any given transaction that gains approval. It is
therefore possible to obtain an independent evaluation of board action,
particularly where the special committee is composed of outside direc-
tors. Conversely, a general partner-whether a person or a corpora-
tion-is an individual. If that individual is interested or biased, it cannot
at once be disinterested and unbiased for the purpose of investigating its
own self-dealing. A corporation is a fictional entity created by law. It
can only speak and act through corporate employees, officers, and
directors.
The court's reasoning is flawed because it fails to adequately weigh this
distinction in its application of corporate fiduciary principles in the con-
text of a limited partnership. As a corporation, it is impossible for
CIGNA to act as a general partner through employees in its finance divi-
sion, and then provide a disinterested and unbiased review of its own
actions through a special committee composed of other members of its
finance division. In other words, it is illogical to suggest that a general
partner can independently review his own conduct. Delaware courts,
however, clearly disagree.
In the end, the Katell court declined to apply the full measure of the
entire fairness test derived from corporate fiduciary principles. 160 While
the second step of the Zapata test is not typically used in the corporate
context, the circumstances presented by a corporate general partner re-
viewing the fairness of its own transaction seems to warrant the in-
dependent judicial review prescribed in Zapata. Finding the special
committee's investigation to satisfy Zapata's procedural requirements,
notwithstanding the procedural deficiencies noted above, the court de-
157. Id.
158. Id. at *12.
159. See id.
160. See id. (citing Zapata, 430 A.2d at 798 (creating a two-step analysis allowing the
court to first inquire into the independence of the special litigation committee and then to




clined to review the substantive fairness of the transaction approved by
CIGNA and Morgan Stanley.161
Examining these facts prospectively, that is from the point of view of a
prospective investor, it would be difficult to foresee that a $15 million act
of self-dealing could go unchecked. Even while the partnership agree-
ment permitted self-dealing, it did so only if the transaction was approved
by the other general partner, and only if that general partner had no in-
terest in the transaction. The prospective investor could reasonably rely
on this alternative to broad fiduciary language because the disinterested
general partner would, in theory, prevent unfairness and harm to the lim-
ited partners.
Looking beyond the debate as to whether CIGNA was interested or
disinterested, one conclusion clearly arises from the facts of the case: the
court declined to review the substantive fairness of the transaction be-
cause it would be forced to conclude that the sale of partnership assets by
Morgan Stanley to Morgan Stanley was unfair to the limited partners.
Such a result could only be achieved by giving "maximum effect" to the
language of the partnership agreement.
In agreeing to permit self-dealing subject to disinterested approval, the
limited partners did not intend to allow a general partner to steal their
share of the profit. Clearly, the intent behind the provision was to allow
self-dealing by a general partner where the transaction did not harm the
interests of the limited partners. Ultimately, the Katell court refused to
look to the intent behind the provision, causing this alternative to fiduci-
ary protection to fail and resulting in a $15 million loss to the limited
partners. It is ironic that Delaware is traditionally heralded as offering a
higher degree of jurisprudential certainty, and yet a limited partner's
search for certainty in contract is slowed by the unstable landscape drawn
by such Delaware decisions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A. DELAWARE DECISIONS AND THE "MAXIMUM EFFECT"
The preceding cases suggest that the Delaware law is hostile toward
fiduciary duty claims filed by limited partners against general partners. It
is therefore important to note that Delaware courts have also upheld fi-
duciary obligations in this context. In In re USACafes, L.P.,162 for exam-
ple, a Delaware court ignored a long-standing rule shielding directors of
corporate general partners from fiduciary duty claims filed by limited
partners.1 63 The court found for the plaintiff, holding that "the directors
of corporate general partners are obligated to cause the general partner
to satisfy its duty to the limited partner.' 64
161. See id. at *13.
162. 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991).
163. See id. at 48; BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 50, at 6:07.
164. Robbins, supra note 47, at 95.
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Even while Delaware law recognizes the fundamental concept of fidu-
ciary duty, it has probably gone farther than any other jurisdiction in de-
nying fiduciary duties and in supporting limited-partnership agreements
that limit or eliminate them.165 By giving "maximum effect to the princi-
ple of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agree-
ments, '166 Delaware law leaves limited partners with virtually no
fiduciary protections. This is especially true considering that most lim-
ited-partnership agreements are written by general partners or their law-
yers, are designed to protect general partners, and are agreed to by
limited partners without an opportunity for effective negotiation. 67 Del-
aware's "maximum effect" policy derives its legitimacy from traditional
freedom-of-contract principles based on equal bargaining power, good
faith negotiation, and fair dealing in the trade. It is unclear how such
principles are related to the way in which limited-partnership agreements
are actually created and signed.
The enforcement component of the "maximum effect" policy raises ad-
ditional concerns for a limited partner. This is because limited partners
must be more careful than other passive investors in entities with active
management, such as shareholders in corporations and limited liability
companies. After all, general partners are typically self-chosen, have per-
manent tenure, and have broad powers without the restraint of a collec-
tive governing board. Correlatively, limited partners have little or no
voting rights, and are thus more vulnerable to losing the benefit for which
they bargained to a self-dealing transaction.
From Whalen to Katell, courts interpreting Delaware law have engaged
in a legal fiction, pretending that limited partners and general partners
enter into agreements that are freely negotiated and represent the agree-
ment-in-fact. Delaware law assumes that investors actually agree to allow
general partners to do as they please with assets and profits belonging to
the limited partnership. Additionally, Delaware has yet to find a case
that exceeds RUPA's lone restriction 168 on contract provisions that mod-
ify fiduciary duties and obligations. One would be hard pressed, indeed,
to find a case under Delaware law in which the court found such a provi-
sion to be "manifestly unreasonable."
While contractarians defend Delaware's "maximum effect" policy
against criticism and calls for greater fiduciary protections, the prospec-
tive investor must approach a Delaware limited partnership with great
hesitation. Putting oneself in the position of the investors in Katell, it is
easy to see how prospective concern over the absence of broad fiduciary
language and the possibility of harmful self-dealing might be assuaged by
165. See Bromberg, supra note 70.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101; see United States Cellular Inv. Co., 677 A.2d at
504 (limited partner failed to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under
§ 17-1101 where complaint failed to allege bad faith).
167. See Bromberg, supra note 70.
168. See RUPA § 103(a)(3) (fiduciary duties may be waived so long as the waiver provi-
sion is not manifestly unreasonable).
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the requirement that self-dealing transactions be approved by a disinter-
ested general partner. It would be difficult to foresee that the disinter-
ested general partner would choose to take a $15 million loss by
approving a self-dealing transaction, or that a court would uphold the
approval by characterizing an interested general partner as disinterested
for purposes of granting the required approval. Yet, that is precisely what
happened in Katell.
Returning to the central inquiry posed by this Comment, it is unclear
whether a limited partner can, under Delaware law, adequately protect
against harmful self-dealing. Further, the risk of investing in a Delaware
limited partnership seems high, given the manner in which the "maximum
effect" principle is applied. In effect, it seems virtually impossible to de-
vise a Delaware limited-partnership agreement providing for adequate
and effective alternatives to traditional fiduciary protections from acts of
harmful self-dealing.
Were all jurisdictions to go as far as Delaware in denying fiduciary du-
ties, an investor would be ill-advised to place funds at risk in a limited
partnership under the control of such an unaccountable general partner.
In short, choosing not to invest is the best alternative to fiduciary protec-
tions that are absent under Delaware limited partnership law. Applied to
limited partnerships generally, however, this alternative carries with it se-
rious economic consequences. Start-up companies, entrepreneurs, and
even communities rely on the billions of dollars generated through the
limited partnership form of investment. 169 Additionally, it would be inac-
curate to apply conclusions based on Delaware limited partnership law so
broadly to the law in other jurisdictions. 170
B. SOME JURISDICTIONS OFFER GREATER CERTAINTY
To be sure, the holding in Adler171 underscores the influence con-
tractarian principles have had in non-Delaware judicial decisions. There
is little certainty offered in a jurisdiction that allows a general partner to
ignore a significant change in circumstances by continuing to conduct
business in a manner that yields only loss for the limited partners because
of that change in circumstances. This is especially true where, as in Adler,
the general partner could have chosen alternative investment strategies
that would have yielded profit to all investors, rather than just the general
partner. Placing oneself in the position of the prospective investor, it
would be difficult to foresee that the general partner would violate his
fiduciary obligation to put the limited partners' interests above his own.
Still, the Illinois court reached a conclusion that is consistent with Dela-
ware decisions: the limited partners agreed to allow self-dealing, even at
the expense of their own financial interests.
169. See Kam, supra note 11.
170. See Bromberg, supra note 70.




Not all jurisdictions are so willing to completely abandon traditional
notions of fiduciary duties and obligations in favor of an approach that
places limited partners at risk. The facts present in both Adler and Katell,
for instance, would probably be decided differently under the laws of
Missouri and Louisiana.
In contrast to contractarian principles, in Palmisano v. Mascaro,172 a
Louisiana court of appeals invalidated a contract provision because it cir-
cumvented the basic fiduciary duties required among partners. There,
the partnership agreement allowed a partner to escape liability for acts
within the scope of his authority that did not constitute malfeasance or
misfeasance. It also gave him sole, uncontrolled authority to decide the
terms under which partnership property would be sold.
In Knopke v. Knopke,173 a Missouri court of appeals invalidated a lim-
ited-partnership agreement that gave the general partner "unqualified
authority" to make all decisions relating to the financial affairs of the
partnership. The partnership agreement, the court held, could not excuse
the general partner from fulfilling his obligation to deal honestly with the
partnership and limited partners.174
Both of these jurisdictions declined to apply Delaware's "maximum ef-
fect" principle to questions arising from express waivers of fiduciary du-
ties in limited-partnership agreements. Traditional principles of fiduciary
duty protect the investor's interest in receiving the benefit for which he
bargained. While self-dealing may be authorized under certain condi-
tions, these courts recognize that self-dealing that results in substantial
detriment to the limited partnership is certainly not the type envisioned
or authorized by the limited-partnership agreement. Furthermore, these
courts recognize an obligation on the part of the general partner to exer-
cise authority granted under the agreement consistent with the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. Such rulings offer greater certainty for
investors in limited partnerships than does the law of Delaware.
The facts in the Whalen case might also yield different results under
New York law. For instance, in Lyall v. Grayco Builders, Inc.,175 a New
York court reviewed a provision in the partnership agreement giving a
partner the right to work on other projects independently. The court re-
lied on fiduciary principles in holding that the provision did not give the
partner the right to divert partnership assets to those other opportuni-
ties, 176 much in the same manner as the general partner in Whalen sought
to exclude his limited partner from opportunities to expand riverboat
gambling operations into other states. 177
172. 611 So. 2d 632 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
173. 837 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
i74. See id. at 915.
175. 584 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1992).
176. See id. at 470.
177. See Whalen, 545 N.W.2d at 290.
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Other states like Texas, 178 Massachusetts 79 and California 80 also pro-
vide greater fiduciary protections than those offered under Delaware law.
Unlike Delaware, these jurisdictions are more willing to invalidate con-
tract provisions that seem to unreasonably modify traditional concepts of
fiduciary obligations. In doing so, these courts reject the legal fiction that
general partners and limited partners negotiate and enter into agree-
ments with equal bargaining power. Instead they give greater weight to
the manner in which limited-partnership agreements are actually drafted
and signed.
Additionally, some jurisdictions offer greater fiduciary protection
under state securities laws to limited partnership interests acquired
through public offerings. "Blue-sky laws," which are designed to protect
"gullible investors" in securities transactions,' 8' have been formally and
informally adopted by most states to limit a general partner's ability to
dilute fiduciary duties.'82 In addition, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission also requires some disclosure of fiduciary obligations in the con-
text of a public offering. 183
C. CHOOSING PREDICTABILITY OVER UNCERTAINTY
The decision to acquire an interest in a limited partnership assumes
that the general partner will not act in conflict with the best interests of
the investor. Indeed, it seems contrary to sound investment strategy to
concede that opportunities and profit might be stolen away by the custo-
dian of the investor's fund. If that is so, an investment is better directed
to a venture that carries less legal risk.
As an investor agrees to relinquish control over money, prudence re-
quires him to seek a high level of certainty that the general partner will
return the profit for which the investor has bargained. Such certainty
requires a fiduciary obligation to put the interests of the investor above
178. See McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 676 (Tex. App. 1993, writ denied)
(weighing the validity of express fiduciary duty waived against "public policy" prohibiting
certain types of self-dealing).
179. See Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991) (court used fiduciary principles
to restrict a provision in the limited-partnership agreement which broadly permitted the
general partner to compete against the limited partnership).
180. See Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1989) (fiduciary
principles used to limit contract provision authorizing partners to compete with the
partnership).
181. See A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 112 (2d ed. 1995).
182. See, e.g., N.A.S.A.A. Rep. (CCH) 3602 E. (August 1991) (publicly offered real
estate program "shall provide that the sponsor shall have fiduciary responsibility for the
safekeeping and use of all funds and assets of the program ... [and] the program shall not
permit the participant to contract away the fiduciary duty owed to the participant by the
sponsor"); N.A.S.A.A. Rep. (CCH) 2622 H. (November 1991) (oil and gas programs
shall not contractually limit any fiduciary duty owed to the participants by the sponsor
except to limit the time the sponsor devotes to the program and to allow limited competi-
tion by the sponsor).
183. See, e.g., S.E.C. Guide 5, Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Inter-
ests in Real Estate Limited Partnerships, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3829, § 6.
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those of the general partner, even where harmless self-dealing is permit-
ted by the limited-partnership agreement.
In search of certainty, investors should be wary of Delaware limited
partnerships. Particularly where the enterprise operates outside Dela-
ware, the general partner's choice of Delaware law signals a need for cau-
tion as to the possibility that the general partner might engage in harmful
self-dealing. Just as a general partner might choose Delaware law based
on the high degree of flexibility it offers, a prospective limited partner
should confine his investment strategy to partnership agreements gov-
erned by state laws that tend to uphold fiduciary obligations. Any state
that gives "maximum effect" to the language of the agreement offers the
general partner an upper-hand over the limited partners. Again, this is
because the general partner usually drafts the agreement without sub-
stantive input from the limited partners.
An investment strategy that stays clear of Delaware limited partnership
law benefits the investor by achieving a higher degree of certainty that
fiduciary duties and obligations will be upheld. Such a strategy also bene-
fits the public need for economic growth and development, because in-
vestors are more likely to engage in start-up ventures and support
entrepreneurial activity under laws that protect their investments from
harmful self-dealing.
In this regard, legal advice becomes equally if not more important than
financial advice in the selection of a limited-partnership interest. A sur-
vey of current legal trends should be conducted before any investment is
made, thereby providing a degree of certainty that the general partner is
not relieved of basic fiduciary obligations. While the debate between
contractarian and fiduciary principles rages on, limited partners must
look out for their own investments and their own self-interest. Avoiding
Delaware law is a good start.
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